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"INDEPENDENT" JURISPRUDENCE
"The great gain in its fundamental conceptions which jurisprudence
made during the last century was the recognition of the truth that the
law of a state ... is not an ideal, but something which actually exists.
It is not that which is in accordance with religion,"or nature, or morality; it is not that which ought to be, but that which is." 1

From the viewpoint of a jurisprudence anchored in a
realistic philosophy, this statement of Professor Gray invites criticism. First, it does not show that the juristic
thought of which he speaks has made any gain by going
to the roots of the science, but rather that it has set that
science back by tearing it up by the roots. Next, far from being a fundamental conception, it appears to be utterly superficial. It is like saying that the great gain in the fundamental conceptions of engineering during recent times is the
recognition of the truth that the rules of the designer in a
construction company are not those which are in accordance
with mathematics or the nature of the materials of construction or the ends that the owners of the building must attain; that they are not what ought to be, but simply that
which they are. It amounts to the denial of the possibility
of all creative effort in the light of pure science, to the denial
of any necessary presuppositions for practical science. To
say that the law of a state is naught else but that which is,
1
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is simply to affirm that the law of the state is the law of the
state, that it is irreducible, absolute, unconditioned. It is to
assert that legislators are independent of any objective principle of control (God, nature, morals) in their law-making,
that the science of jurisprudence is self-sufficient, and that
whatever legislative enactment may be promulgated is ipso
facto law, and so rightly immune from criticism on the
grounds of religious truth, or natural order, or ethical obligation.
The writer has no quarrel with anyone who wishes to
restrict his study to the observation and classification of
mere facts, even if those facts happen to be the positive
laws of a state. Doubtless, one may take notice of them, describe them, group them on the basis of some common property, and list the conceptions that seem to be most widely
employed, and so deservedly qualified as fundamental. Exception is taken when this method is heralded forth as a
sign of notable progress in the science of jurisprudence or
the philosophy of law, when it is presented as a procedure
having superior methodological value, and so one which may
claim the right to supplant all other methods of approach
to juristic questions.
There are, it seems to me, two distinct, but equally legitimate, lines which criticism of this theory may follow. Since
it is but one of several instances of the modern revolt against
the reliability of intellect in philosophical investigation, it
may from that angle undertake to demonstrate its shortcomings as a philosophy of law. On the other hand, because the
"facts" with which jurisprudence deals are not physical,
but moral entities, not the result of predetermined causes,
but the result of rational deliberation and free decision, not
merely things that are, but things that are brought into being, and precisely as norms or criteria of action, one may
attempt to prove that on the grounds of method it fails to
conform to the canons of science. In brief, the so-called

"INDEPENDENT" JURISPRUDENCE

analytical method which claims to make jurisprudence an
"independent" discipline is neither a philosophy of law nor
a science of law.
"The study of aesthetic phenomena," it was recently said,
"is just now emerging from the metaphysical and literary
stage toward the scientific, but has not reached it." 2 Here
the term science is set over against the term metaphysical
with the obvious suggestion that whereas science connotes
certain and demonstrable knowledge of a subject, metaphysics or philosophy implies only vague and ill-defined
conceptions of it, and though it may yield interesting opinions, it can never reach certainty. This is typical of the
positivist attitude toward philosophy, as if philosophy were
but "a collective name for questions that have not yet been
answered to the satisfaction of all by whom they have been
asked," as if its sphere were but the "great uncleared
ground" of thought, as if, as a facetious Frenchman put it,
it were but "l'art de s'6gare avec methode."
As the behaviorist pretends to be able to build up a psychology on the "pure facts of behavior," so the analytical
jurist pretends to construct a science of jurisprudence on
the "pure fact of law." Both are curiously inconsistent, for
both presuppose, and necessarily presuppose, a very definite,
even if erroneous, kind of philosophy. One can no more escape a philosophy than he can flee from his own shadow.
The transparent philosophical assumptions of the behaviorist in psychology, as of the pure-fact-of-law jurist, is that
the positive is irreducible, that nothing exists but the actual,
that nothing is knowable with certainty but the sensible and
measurable, and therefore that the phenomena of the rational and moral order may be dealt with in the same way
as the phenomena of the sensible and material order. Thus
in both instances there are assumptions of general and ab2
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solute principles which with their manifold implications constitute a whole philosophy of reality, of knowledge, and of
man.
When the analytical jurist says that "the law of a state
or other organized body is not an ideal, but something
which actually exists," he evidently does not assume that
anybody ever was of a mind to deny that an actually existing positive legal enactment, such as the shooting of wild
ducks during the months of July and August is forbidden
in the State of Indiana, could in some way simultaneously
not exist. He rather wishes us to believe that such or any
other legal enactment promulgated by any political sovereignty may rightly claim the status of law without reference
to any general truth prior to and superior to it in the realms
respectively of religion or philosophy of nature or morals,
as to a norm whereby its nature as a genuine law might be
determined. He not only says that the actual is real, which
none will deny, but he also says that the contingent and
variable real may exist and be understood independently
of or without reference to an absolute and invariable, that
is, an ideal, a claim that no realistic philosopher will admit.
Indeed, in what he says he actually contradicts himself. For
in asserting that the law of a state is simply "that which
is," he asserts that the criterion or norm or ideal by which
any rule of action enacted by a state may be known as a
law and as claiming the obedience of subjects, is the unconditioned will of the state. So that if one were tempted to
criticize such a rule he might conceivably do so on some
ground, but not on the ground that it was at odds with the
Divine Law or the natural order of things, or the principles
of morality, or of anything conceived of as prior to or independent of the state. In brief, the state itself is put in
the first place, and, so far as jurisprudence is concerned, displaces or replaces God and nature and man. As Dean Pound,
discussing the question of Law and Morals in connection
with the analytical school of jurisprudence, aptly remarks:
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"We are back again to the state as the unchallengeable authority behind legal precepts. The state takes the place of
Jehovah handing the tables of the Law to Moses.... Law

is law by convention and enactment.".
All of this converges toward the anti-intellectualistic dogma that, since we cannot discover in religion or philosophy
of nature or morals any universally valid and fundamental
principles upon which to ground, our science of jurisprudence, we must simply fall back upon the "pure fact of law,"
and say without further ado that that everywhere and indisputably is law which has been enacted by the state. But
from our discussion thus far it is clear that this pure-factof-law theory, in declaring its independence of philosophy,
implicitly assumes a philosophy, and one which at the same
time conspicuously fails to elucidate even the fundamental
conceptions of the study which presupposed it. For to say
that a law is simply that which is, is merely to indicate the
presence of something, not to explain or to justify it. If, as
this theory does contend, law is made from precedent, or
that "it stands upon its own basis. as a system of precepts
imposed or enforced by a sovereign," it leaves both the
precedent and the enactment unexplained and unjustified.
It falls back upon something which is not ultimate, and so
not independent or self-sufficient. A genuine philosophy of
law, as a philosophy of anything else, seeks the ultimate as
its proper aim and objective.
"Science," it is said, "is just the answer to questions."
But it would be more accurate to say that it is a systematic
or organized body of answers to questions of a peculiar
type about a definite object. For while science is indeed
knowledge, it is not synonymous wjih all knowledge. While
all of us know that many things are true, the scientist
knows also why they are true, and the answer to the question, Why? inevitably involves answering the questions,
3
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Whence? and What?*All scientific knowledge is a process of
mental unification of the manifold of concrete reality. The
principle of this unification is also the principle of order and
of system, and so also of proof and verification. Intellectual
curiosity or reflective wonder about anything expresses itself in the commonplace question: What is that for? It is
spontaneously assumed that once we know the end or purpose of a thing-and not till then-we can begin to understand what it is, its nature, and from this knowledge we can
see what it ought to be and how it came to be at all. In other
words, intellectual knowledge proceeds from a knowledge
of purpose to an understanding of nature to a comprehension of origins. Science is simply a knowledge of things
through their causes, and when these causes happen to be
ultimate causes, science becomes philosophy or philosophical
science.
It is rightly demanded then of any study which pretends
to be scientific that it give some account of the whence and
the what and the wherefore of things,-that it first tell us
what the things are for, and then, in the light of that, in the
case of moral science at least, indicate the criteria by reason
of which we can determine the difference between what they
are and what they ought to be, and so display their dependencies or causal relations.
Now how does the analytical jurist meet these requirements? As Pound has pointed out, he regards the "science of
law as wholly self-sufficient." ' Such a science, I take it,
would be one claiming independence of any presuppositions,
that is, of any propositiofns demonstrated as true in departments of knowledge which investigate the same general subject matter, but from different and more fundamental points
of view. Since all knowledge has to do with reality,--I ignore
the pure subjectivist as outside the pale of possible disputants,-that science alone can in any intelligible sense be
4
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called self-sufficient which deals with the presuppositions of
all knowledge, which investigates being and its primary implications. Such is the science of metaphysics. Beyond it,
scientific study deals either with some particular being or
class of beings or aspect of them, and consequently assumes
as true the principles demonstrated in the more general and
basic studies.
If now we apply this to the science of law, it is immediately clear that the subject matter of positive law, the exclusive object of analytical jurisprudence, is far from being the
basic science having to do with human actions, and so is
far from being independent or self-sufficient. If, as everyone concedes, law is a rule for human action, then it should
be evident that no one can pretend to study law scientifically apart from certain definite presuppositions as to what man
is and what human action is for. For if rule exists for action,
action exists for end, and as the character of the action depends directly on the character of the agent, the character
of the rule must also be determined by the nature of the
agent. But what man is and whence he came and what ultimately is the meaning and purpose of human life are questions which, though adequately answered only by Christian
Revelation, are nevertheless answered also by reason in the
sacred science of theology and in philosophy of mind and
ethics. The conclusions therefore of these sciences may-not
logically be ignored by the student of positive law. It is
arbitrary in the extreme to isolate jurisprudence from the
other bodies of scientific knowledge concerning man and
the norms of his action, a wholly unwarranted divorcement
of a particular and subordinate science from more general and fundamental sciences.
If it be objected that analytical jurisprudence is not a
normative, but a descriptive science, the answer is that
juristic science, whether it view its subject matter in its
origin, or its factial aspects, or in its application, or in its
social effects, is inextricably bound up with the normative;
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it is inseparable from the questions: Has this statute the essentials of genuine law? Can men safely conform to it in
their actions? Will it, if observed, secure proper human behavior, or promote the common welfare? Has a government
the right to impose such a mandate upon its subjects? A
forceful analogy is at hand in the science of medicine. Fancy
a research worker in the field of medicine saying: "I shall
examine the history of medical theory and practice; I shall
then correlate different views and theories, compare one
with the other and give them appropriate names, but then I
shall have reached the limits of the scope of my science. I
grant you that the aim of medical science is to prescribe
laws of health. Well, here they are. But whether in practice
they are what they ought to be, whether in practice they
would require men to ignore the truths of religion or to
violate the prescriptions of the natural law, or repudiate
spontaneous and universal mGral intuitions,-

in these mat-

ters I am not interested. As a medical scientist I tell you,
not what the laws of health ought to be, but only what analysis of the existing theories of medicine shows they are."
Fortunately, medical men are neither so short-sighted or
so unscientific. They do indeed find out what laws of health
have from time to time been drawn up, but they most assuredly also criticize them, modifying or rejecting them,
and substituting new and better ones in their place. Let it
be noted also that this criticism is grounded on their improved knowledge of the human organism as a whole, and
of what is the natural purpose and function of each of its
parts and of their relation to other facts and to other things.
And it is in these facts that is found the origin of the norms
or laws of health which they teach us, and which therefore
enable medical men to say, not only what they are, but
also what they ought to be.
The application of this to the science of law is too obvious
to need extended comment. In the one case as in the other
this inescapable fact emerges, that in making rules for hu-
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man action, one is either placing human actions in the same
category as the actions of inanimate and irrational things or
he is simply playing a game of blind man's buff, unless he
takes into constant consideration the origin and the nature
of man, and the character of the ends which by reason of
such nature he is bound to seek. This consideration will
most certainly reveal a dependence of jurisprudence upon
religion and philosophy of nature and ethical principle. The
Cpure-fact-of-law" jurisprudence is no more jurisprudence in
the propef sense of that word than is the mere history of
ethical theory moral science. The claim of self-sufficiency
therefore is as fatuous in theory as history has shown it to
be impossible in practice.
Charles C. Miltner.
University of Notre Dame.

